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Hotline Ping: Harmonizing 
Contemporary Cell Phone Technology 
with Traditional Fourth Amendment 
Protections 
Brianne M. Chevalier 
INTRODUCTION 
“The judiciary must not allow the ubiquity of 
technology—which threatens to cause greater and greater 
intrusions into our private lives—to erode our 
constitutional protections.”1 
A murder has taken place and the police have a suspect who 
they believe is responsible for the crime.  The government wants 
to place the suspect at the scene of the crime, at the time the 
crime occurred.  Unfortunately, there were no eyewitnesses to 
identify the suspect, so the government needs an alternative way 
to prove that its suspect was present at the scene.  In order to do 
so, the government files for a court order that will allow it to 
 
 Candidate for Juris Doctor, Roger Williams University School of Law, 2017. 
I am grateful to Professor Emily J. Sack for her wisdom, guidance, and 
thoughtful suggestions through the entirety of the writing process.  Also, to 
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 1.  United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 533 (11th Cir. 2015) (Martin, 
J., dissenting). 
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compel the cell phone service provider to turn over cell site 
location information from the suspect’s cell phone records.  This 
information would include the phone numbers the suspect 
contacted or was contacted by, as well as the location of the 
suspect when these connections were made.  Should the 
government be permitted to obtain this type of information from 
cell service providers (e.g. Verizon, T-Mobile, or Sprint) without a 
search warrant based on probable cause, and thereby create a 
play-by-play of a person’s location—including, but not limited to, 
the location where the crime occurred—over a given period of 
time?  Most federal appellate courts have answered this question 
affirmatively.2 Under the Fourth Amendment, however, 
government acquisition of cell phone location records from cell 
service providers should be considered a search because 
individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy in this 
information.3  Therefore, obtaining this type of information 
without a warrant based on probable cause presumably violates 
the Fourth Amendment.4 
As technology advances, so too must the application of the 
Fourth Amendment, specifically with regard to government 
procurement of cell phone location records from cell service 
providers.  Until May 2016,5 federal circuit courts were split on 
the issues of whether (1) obtaining historical cell phone location 
records from service providers is a “search” under the Fourth 
Amendment, and (2) if so, whether a “reasonable search” requires 
the government to obtain a search warrant based on probable 
cause.6  Courts face the challenge of determining the legal 
 
 2.  See id. at 500; United States v. Graham (Graham I), 796 F.3d 332 
(4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016); In re United 
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 3.  See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967).  
 4.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in 
their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and 
seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon 
probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing 
the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.”). 
 5.  In May 2016, Graham was reheard en banc, overturning the original 
decision of the Fourth Circuit and thereby abolishing the circuit split that 
was in place when the case was first decided.  United States v. Graham 
(Graham II), 824 F.3d 421, 425–26 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  Throughout this 
Comment, United States v. Graham, 796 F.3d 332 (4th Cir. 2015) will be 
referred to as “Graham I” and United States v. Graham, 824 F.3d 421 (4th 
Cir. 2016) (en banc) will be referred to as “Graham II.” 
 6.  Megan L. McKeown, Note, Whose Line is it Anyway? Probable Cause 
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standard that law enforcement must meet in order to require the 
cell service providers to disclose information.7 
Part I of this Comment will introduce the basic function of cell 
towers and records, describe the difference between historical and 
real-time information, and provide a cursory review of the 
statutory landscape. Part II will discuss relevant Fourth 
Amendment case law that supplies the framework for determining 
when there is a search and, if so, when a warrant based on 
probable cause is required.  Part III will focus on the most recent 
United States Courts of Appeals cases which have occasionally 
fallen on both sides of the fence regarding the questions of 
whether a search has occurred and whether a warrant is required.  
Finally, Part IV will address the strengths and weaknesses of both 
sides of the arguments.  This section will also assert and explain 
why government acquisition of cell site location information 
(CSLI) is a search, why a warrant based on probable cause is 
required, and finally why the Stored Communications Act (SCA), 
which governs court orders required for attainment of this 
information, is unconstitutional. 
I. CELL PHONE TOWER FUNCTIONS, DATA BASICS, AND APPLICABLE 
STATUTES 
The technologies employed in devices people use every day to 
work and function in society are often a mystery to those who use 
such devices.  This section explains how the government acquires 
historical CSLI by connecting to cell towers.  Understanding this 
process is crucial to fully grasp why the government’s acquisition 
of historical CSLI is a search that requires a warrant based on 
probable cause.  Additionally, this explanation is important to 
understand because the standard for acquisition of this 
information is currently lower under the SCA than what the 
warrant requirement entails, and is therefore unconstitutional. 
A. Cell Phone Tower Operations 
Cell phones are supported by a network of cell towers that 
relay messages from the user, through the service carrier, to the 
 
and Historical Cell Site Data, 90 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2039, 2039–40 (2015). 
 7.  See Peter A. Crusco, Cell Tower Dumps and the Fourth Amendment, 
N.Y.L.J. ONLINE (June 24, 2014).  
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intended recipient.8  In 1985, there were just 900 cell phone 
towers in the United States;9 however, as of March 2015, the 
presence of cell towers has increased drastically and there are now 
over 205,000 throughout the country.10  These cell towers are 
placed at various locations throughout a service provider’s 
coverage area.11  A tower is in constant contact with activated, 
turned-on cell phones within its proximity so that calls and 
messages are relayed instantly.12  The cell phone connects to a cell 
tower whenever a call or text message is sent or received by the 
cell phone.13  The phone will usually connect with, or “ping,” the 
closest cell site where it has the strongest signal.14  As a cell 
phone is physically moved to various locations, it “hops” from 
tower to tower, potentially allowing law enforcement to track the 
movements of the phone.15  The accuracy of the location data 
depends on the size of the geographical coverage range of the cell 
sites.16  This Comment exclusively addresses the pinging of cell 
towers, and not a cell phone’s Global Positioning System (GPS) 
function that is a separate and distinct feature.17 
Once the nearest cell tower is identified, CSLI can be used to 
determine the location of the cell phone at the particular point in 
time that the connection is made.18  CSLI consists of the dialed 
digits of calls to and from the telephone number, and the locations 
and sectors of the cell towers used at the time of the call’s origin 
and termination.19  Law enforcement officers often use CSLI to 
 
 8.  Leonard Deutchman, Cell Phone Tracking: Privacy or Anonymity?, 
THE LEGAL INTELLIGENCER (Dec. 14, 2010), http://www.ldiscovery.com/law 
_library/pennsylvania%20law%20weekly%20cell%20tower%20tracking/files/ 
pennsylvania%20law%20weekly%20cell%20tower%20tracking%20.pdf.   
 9.  Cell Phone Tower Statistics, STATISTIC BRAIN, http://www.statistic 
brain.com/cell-phone-tower-statistics/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2016). 
 10.  Id.; Deutchman, supra note 8.  
 11.  Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 
421 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 12.  Deutchman, supra note 8.  
 13.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 343.  
 14.  Id.  Cell site and cell tower are synonymous and will be used 
interchangeably throughout this Comment.  
 15.  Deutchman, supra note 8.  
 16.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 343.  
 17.  To be clear, the pinging of cell phone towers is not something that 
will soon become obsolete and replaced by the GPS function on a phone.  
These are two separate and distinct functions of a cell phone.  
 18.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 343.  
 19.  Crusco, supra note 7.    
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develop a list of suspects that were in a crime area at a given time, 
or to determine that a specific suspect was in an area at the time a 
crime occurred.20  Specifically, officers can request that a service 
provider turn over location data for a suspect over a set period of 
time—this is called historical CSLI.21 
There is an important distinction to be made between 
historical CSLI and real-time information.  This Comment will 
specifically discuss law enforcements’ need for a warrant when 
seeking historical CSLI.  Historical CSLI includes records that are 
already created and maintained by a third-party telephone 
company22 and precise data regarding date and time of cell calls, 
and location of a cell phone.23  Moreover, the records show 
incoming and outgoing telephone numbers that connect with the 
cell tower, including voice calls and text messages.24  Historical 
CSLI also includes how long these communications lasted as well 
as the cell towers used at the beginning and at the end of the 
communication.25 
Conversely, real-time data is information collected at the 
moment in time it occurs.26  The distinction between these two 
types of data is important because real-time data raises distinct 
issues, such as exigency,27 that historical data does not.  To 
ensure constitutionality, procurement of historical data requires a 
showing of probable cause, which the SCA does not require. 
B. The Stored Communications Act 
The SCA is the federal statute that governs historical cell site 
 
 20.  See, e.g., United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 502 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(Government tracked phone calls to and from defendant’s cell phone 
connected through cell tower locations that were near relevant robbery 
locations; thus arguing that defendant had to be near robberies as well.).  
 21.  Monu Bedi, The Curious Case of Cell Phone Location Data: Fourth 
Amendment Doctrine Mash-Up, 110 NW. U.L. REV. 507, 510 (2016). 
 22.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 505.  
 23.  Id. at 502.   
 24.  Amanda Regan, Note, Dumping the Probable Cause Requirement: 
Why the Supreme Court Should Decide Probable Cause is Not Necessary for 
Cell Tower Dumps, 43 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1189, 1192 (2015). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  See Patrick T. Chamberlain, Note, Court Ordered Disclosure of 
Historical Cell Site Location Information: The Argument for a Probable Cause 
Standard, 66 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1745, 1748 (2009). 
 27.  See infra Part IV. 
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location information cases.28  It allows law enforcement to use 
“‘stored user account information compiled by third parties in the 
ordinary course of business’” without having to prove probable 
cause.29  Specifically, the SCA provides: 
A court order for disclosure . . . may be issued by any 
court that is a court of competent jurisdiction and shall 
issue only if the governmental entity offers specific and 
articulable facts showing that there are reasonable 
grounds to believe that the contents of a wire or electronic 
communication, or the records or other information 
sought, are relevant and material to an ongoing criminal 
investigation.30 
The government can obtain this information by filing for a 
court order under § 2703(d) requesting information from cell 
service providers.31  Court orders differ from search warrants in 
that the required legal standard to acquire an SCA court order—
specific and articulable facts—is much lower than the requirement 
of probable cause to obtain a search warrant.32  This lower SCA 
standard poses a great threat to an individual’s Fourth 
Amendment right; however, while the SCA standard is lower than 
that for a search warrant, the SCA raised the bar for what is 
required by the government to obtain information from third 
 
 28. 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (Westlaw current through P.L. 114–248); see, 
e.g., Graham II, 824 F.3d 421, 426 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc); Graham I, 796 
F.3d 332, 343–44 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016); 
United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 502 (11th Cir. 2015); In re United 
States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 602 (5th Cir. 2013).  
 29.  Regan, supra note 24, at 1196 (quoting Steven M. Harkins, Note, 
CSLI Disclosure: Why Probable Cause Is Necessary to Protect What’s Left of 
the Fourth Amendment, 68 WASH & LEE L. REV. 1875, 1896 (2011)). 
 30.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (Westlaw). 
 31.  See In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 615. 
 32.  Id. at 606; see also 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(c)–(d) (Westlaw); In re United 
States for an Order Authorizing Release of Historical Cell-site Information, 
736 F. Supp. 2d 578, 580 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) (holding that as statutory matter § 
2703(c)-(d) permit courts to issue order without showing of probable cause).  
However, “[s]tatutory authority, of course, is not sufficient if such authority 
purports to allow, without a showing of probable cause, a search or seizure 
that must be considered unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment.” Id. at 
581.  Thus, “it is manifest that Congress did not purport in enacting that law 
to definitively accept or reject the reasonableness of any particular 
expectation of privacy with respect to location tracking—and that therefore 
the statute is not immune to Fourth Amendment scrutiny.” Id. at 581 n.9. 
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parties via a subpoena.33  For example, “the government routinely 
issues subpoenas to third parties to produce a wide variety of 
business records, such as credit card statements, bank statements, 
hotel bills, purchase orders, and billing invoices.”34  With the 
enactment of the SCA, Congress demands more information than 
what is required for a subpoena before the government can 
retrieve the telephone records from a cell service provider,35 but, 
the SCA standard is lower than what is required to obtain a 
search warrant based on probable cause.36 
Although the SCA standard is lower than probable cause, it is 
worth mentioning that it does provide individuals with certain 
privacy protections.37  For example, the SCA “generally prohibits 
telephone companies from voluntarily disclosing such records to a 
‘governmental entity.’”38  Among other protections, the SCA 
provides penalties and remedies for violations of the Act where 
there was improper disclosure of records.39  If a judge issues a 
court order, however, the cell service provider must give out the 
information requested without being required to provide notice to 
the customer.40  The unconstitutionality of the “specific and 
articulable facts” standard, which is a lower legal standard than 
that of probable cause, is one of the major concerns regarding the 
gathering of historical CSLI.41 
 
 33.  See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505–06 (11th Cir. 2015); In 
re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 606. 
 34.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 506; see, e.g., United States v. Willis, 759 F.2d 
1486, 1498 (11th Cir. 1985) (motel registration records); United States v. 
Phibbs, 999 F.2d 1053, 1077 (6th Cir. 1993) (credit card statements). 
Additionally, “[t]hose statements not only show location at the time of 
purchase, but also reveal intimate details of daily life, such as shopping 
habits, medical visits, and travel plans.”  Davis, 785 F.3d at 506 n.9. 
 35.  See id. at 506; 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (Westlaw). 
 36.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 37.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 506; see 18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (Westlaw). 
 38.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 506 (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2702(a)(3), (c)(4), c(6)). 
 39.  Id. (citing 18 U.S.C. § 2707(a), (c), (d)). 
 40.  See Regan, supra note 24, at 1197 (citing Elizabeth Elliot, Comment, 
United States v. Jones: The (Hopefully Temporary) Derailment of Cell-Site 
Location Information Protection, 15 LOY. J. PUB. INT. L. 1, 19 (2013)). 
 41.  18 U.S.C.A. § 2703(d) (Westlaw). 
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II. FOURTH AMENDMENT HISTORY AND UNITED STATES COURTS’ TAKE 
ON HISTORICAL CELL SITE DATA 
A. Was There a “Search” Under the Fourth Amendment? 
The Fourth Amendment guarantees “the right of the people to 
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against 
unreasonable searches and seizures.”42  In analyzing a Fourth 
Amendment claim, the reviewing court first determines whether 
or not a search occurred.43  If there was a search, probable cause 
and a warrant were required.44  Then, the reviewing court must 
determine whether an exception to the warrant requirement 
applies.45 
The United States Supreme Court decision in Katz v. United 
States is controlling when analyzing the gathering of historical 
CSLI because the determination as to whether a “search” has 
occurred turns on whether a cell phone user has a reasonable 
expectation of privacy.46  Katz established that the scope of the 
Fourth Amendment is no longer determined by the absence or 
presence of a physical intrusion.47  In a concurring opinion, 
Justice Harlan advanced a two-part test, which now guides Fourth 
Amendment analysis to determine whether a search occurred.48  
The first prong of the test focuses on whether the individual had a 
subjective expectation of privacy in the object of the challenged 
search.49  If so, the court then analyzes whether society is willing 
to objectively recognize that expectation as reasonable.50  In order 
to succeed in claiming that an intrusion was unconstitutional, a 
party must satisfy both parts of this test.51  As discussed below,52 
 
 42.  U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 43.  See, e.g., Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 739–40 (1979); Katz v. 
United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 
1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 1995). 
 44.  See, e.g., Smith, 442 U.S. at 745–46; Katz, 389 U.S. at 356–57; 
Robinson, 62 F.3d at 1330. 
 45.  See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 357–58. 
 46.  Id. at 353. Furthermore, United States v. Jones is not applicable here 
because this is not a situation involving trespass or interference with 
physical property. See 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012).  
 47.  389 U.S. at 353. 
 48.  Id. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). 
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  United States v. Robinson, 62 F.3d 1325, 1328 (11th Cir. 1995).  
 52.  See infra Part IV. 
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the government’s procurement of historical CSLI is a search under 
the Fourth Amendment and consequently requires a warrant 
based on probable cause. 
B. The Good-Faith Exception to the Exclusionary Rule 
If a search has occurred, probable cause and a search warrant 
are required absent an exception.  If there is no search warrant 
and no exception applies, then the Fourth Amendment is violated 
and the evidence obtained is subject to the exclusionary rule.53  
Exceptions to the warrant requirement include the good-faith 
exception,54 which is of particular importance in situations 
involving warrantless government acquisition of historical CSLI.55 
The good-faith exception applies when “law enforcement 
[officers] reasonably rel[y] on (1) an enacted statute, unless that 
statute is clearly unconstitutional; (2) a search warrant or other 
court order issued by a neutral magistrate, unless issuance of the 
order is clearly defective; or (3) binding appellate precedent.”56  
For example, the Fourth Circuit originally asserted in Graham I57 
that, although the government violated the Fourth Amendment in 
obtaining historical CSLI without a warrant based on probable 
cause, the evidence obtained was not suppressed because the 
government acted in good-faith reliance on court orders issued 
under the SCA.58 
As previously mentioned, and more thoroughly discussed 
below,59 the standard required for a court order under the SCA is 
far lower than that for probable cause.  This Comment argues that 
this sub-constitutional standard should not encompass the same 
good-faith exception.  The rights under the Fourth Amendment 
are protected under the probable cause requirements, but the 
lowering of constitutional safeguards in the issuance of court 
orders inevitably mirrors a lowered protection of rights in this 
 
 53.  Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 656–57 (1961). 
 54.  United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 919–22 (1984).  
 55.  See, e.g., Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 362 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 
824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 56.  Id. (citations omitted).  
 57.  See infra Part IV.  The Graham II opinion did not discuss the good-
faith exception like the court in Graham I; however, the exception must be 
addressed because it is still a very relevant concern on this topic and may be 
used in future decisions. 
 58.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 362. 
 59.  See infra Part IV. 
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circumstance, which is unconstitutional.60  Therefore, the good-
faith exception should not apply, as it is not reasonable for the 
government to rely on such a court order that was not obtained 
based on the constitutionally required standard. 
C. The Third-Party Doctrine 
Another concept generally applied to searches involving cell 
phones is the “third-party doctrine,” which establishes that “a 
person has no legitimate expectation of privacy in information he 
voluntarily turns over to third parties.”61  Courts have interpreted 
the third-party doctrine to support the argument that individual 
cell phone users assume the risk that information will be disclosed 
to law enforcement when using their cellular devices.62  
Furthermore, some courts have doubted that “‘people in general 
entertain any actual expectation of privacy in the numbers they 
dial’ because ‘[a]ll telephone users realize that they must ‘convey’ 
phone numbers to the telephone company . . . .’”63  The third-party 
doctrine has proven controversial when applied to cell phone 
location data, however, as many have debated whether this 
doctrine is still viable in light of the major technological and social 
changes over the past several decades.64 
In contrast, some courts have considered the proposition that 
the doctrine does not apply to cell phone location data because the 
cell phone user does not voluntarily convey their location 
information to their service provider.65  This idea is based on the 
proposition that “[c]ell phone use is not only ubiquitous in our 
society today but, at least for an increasing portion of our society, 
it has become essential to full cultural and economic 
 
 60.  See U.S. CONST. amend. IV.  
 61.  Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743–44 (1979); accord McKeown, 
supra note 6, at 2041. 
 62.  See United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 508–09 (11th Cir. 2015) 
(stressing findings in Smith that third-party doctrine can apply to telephone 
calls to third persons outside of the home); In re United States for Historical 
Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 612–13 (5th Cir. 2013) (applying Smith’s 
reasoning involving a telephone user to a cell service subscriber). 
 63.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 508 (quoting Smith, 442 U.S. at 742). 
 64.  RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R43586, THE 
FOURTH AMENDMENT THIRD-PARTY DOCTRINE 1 (2014); Crusco, supra note 7, 
at 2.  
 65.  Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 354 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 
421 (4th Cir. 2016); Crusco, supra note 7, at 2.  
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participation.”66  This proposition is based on the idea that 
“[p]eople cannot be deemed to have volunteered to forfeit 
expectations of privacy by simply seeking active participation in 
society through use of their cell phones.”67  Because cell phone 
users are not voluntarily conveying information to third parties, 
the third-party doctrine is not applicable; therefore, this 
information demands Fourth Amendment protection from 
unreasonable searches.68 
III. APPLICATION OF THE FOURTH AMENDMENT TO ACQUISITION OF 
CELL SITE LOCATION INFORMATION 
Cell phone records are useful to criminal investigations 
because they reveal information that shows which cell towers a 
particular cell phone was closest to in a given period of time—
information generally used to place a suspect at a crime scene.69  
Courts disagree on whether or not individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy regarding their cell phone records or if 
individuals voluntarily disclose this information through the use 
of their cell phones.70  Specifically, there has been disagreement 
among the courts as to whether it is a search to obtain historical 
CSLI from service providers, and, if so, whether a warrant based 
on probable cause is required.71  These cases do not involve a GPS 
device, physical trespass, or real-time or prospective cell tower 
location information.72  Rather, they narrowly involve only 
government access to the existing and legitimate business records 
that a third-party telephone company has already created and 
maintained, and historical information about which cell tower 
locations connected the cell phone in question during a given time 
 
 66.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355–56. 
 67.  Id. at 356. 
 68.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 957 (Sotomayor, J., 
concurring).  
 69.  See, e.g., Graham I, 796 F.3d at 341; Deutchman, supra note 8. 
 70.  Compare Graham I, 796 F.3d at 361 (holding that a person has a 
reasonable expectation of privacy), with United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 
518 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that no reasonable expectation of privacy 
because information was voluntarily conveyed to third party).  
 71.  Lance J. Rogers, Massachusetts Cops Need Warrant for Tower Data, 
BLOOMBERG BNA (Sept. 30, 2015), http://www.bna.com/massachusetts-cops-
need-n57982059186/. 
 72.  See Davis, 785 F.3d at 505.  
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period.73 
In In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, the Fifth 
Circuit held that using the SCA standard—allowing orders that 
are based on specific and articulable facts—rather than a Fourth 
Amendment probable cause standard is constitutionally 
permissible under the Fourth Amendment because people do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in their cell phone 
records.74  The Eleventh Circuit reached a similar conclusion in 
United States v. Davis, holding that no “search” had occurred 
because the individuals did not possess a reasonable expectation 
of privacy.75  The court further held that the SCA standard 
comports with Fourth Amendment principles and is therefore 
constitutional.76 
Conversely, in Graham I, the Fourth Circuit held “that the 
government’s procurement and inspection of [the suspects’] 
historical CSLI was a search, and the government violated [the 
suspects’] Fourth Amendment rights by engaging in this search 
without first securing a judicial warrant based on probable 
cause.”77  The Fourth Circuit has since reversed this decision in 
Graham II.78 
A. Is Government Acquisition of Historical CSLI a Search Under 
the Fourth Amendment? 
1. In re Historical Cell Site Data 
In In re Historical Cell Site Data, the Fifth Circuit held that 
no search had occurred because the Fourth Amendment protects 
only reasonable expectations of privacy; therefore, there was no 
violation of the Fourth Amendment under the third-party 
doctrine.79  The court, by employing the two-part Katz analysis, 
 
 73.  See id.  
 74.  724 F.3d 600, 615 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 75.  785 F.3d at 518.  
 76.  Id.  
 77.  796 F.3d at 361. 
 78.  824 F.3d 421, 424 (11th Cir. 2016) (en banc). 
 79.  724 F.3d at 615.  In this case, the United States filed three 
applications under § 2703(d) of the . . . SCA, seeking evidence relevant to 
three separate criminal investigations.  Each application requested a court 
order to compel the cell phone service provider for a particular cell phone to 
produce sixty days of historical cell site data and other subscriber 
information for that phone.   
Id. at 602 (citations omitted). 
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determined that no warrant was necessary since there was no 
reasonable expectation of privacy.80  In addressing the expectation 
of privacy, the court explained that “‘[w]hat a person knowingly 
exposes to the public, even in his own home or office, is not a 
subject of Fourth Amendment protection.’”81  Relying heavily on 
the third-party doctrine, the court agreed with the argument that 
cell phone users knowingly convey information about their 
location to their service providers when they make a call and that, 
even with that knowledge, they voluntarily continue to make such 
calls foregoing any reasonable expectation of privacy.82  The court 
relied on Smith v. Maryland, which noted that all subscribers 
recognize that the phone company controls the equipment that 
allows their calls to be completed and that the service providers 
have records for numbers that they dial.83  The court further 
explained that even if subscribers do not have this “common 
knowledge,” the government presented evidence that the contract 
between providers and subscribers expressly stated that a 
provider both uses and collects a subscriber’s location information 
to route the cell phone calls.84  Additionally, the court reasoned 
that the government does not require a member of the public to 
own or carry a cell phone; rather the use of his or her phone is 
entirely voluntary.85 
The court in In re Historical Cell Site Data particularly 
addressed the question of whether the “specific and articulable 
facts” standard required under the SCA for a court order is 
constitutional.86  The court concluded that, by enacting the SCA, 
Congress crafted a legislative solution to the privacy concerns that 
develop with advances in technology.87  The court explained that 
the SCA is constitutional because cases interpreting the Fourth 
Amendment, 
[do] not recognize a situation where a conventional order 
for a third party’s voluntarily created business records 
 
 80.  See id. at 608–12. 
 81.  Id. at 609 (quoting Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967)) 
(alteration in original).  
 82.  Id. at 612. 
 83.  Id. (quoting Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 742–43 (1979)).  
 84.  Id. at 613 (quoting California v. Greenwood, 486 U.S. 35, 40 (1988)).  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  Id. at 608. 
 87.  Id. at 614.  
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transforms into a Fourth Amendment search or seizure 
when the records cover more than some specified time 
period or shed light on a target’s activities in an area 
traditionally protected from governmental intrusion.88 
As explained below,89 the logic employed by this court is flawed 
considering the relevant and essential role that cell phones have 
in peoples’ lives today, as well as the lack of voluntariness 
employed by cell phone users.90 
2. United States v. Davis 
Like the Fifth Circuit, the Eleventh Circuit in United States v. 
Davis held that government acquisition of historical CSLI is not a 
search, and therefore the SCA standard is constitutional under 
Fourth Amendment principles.91  Furthermore, the Eleventh 
Circuit agreed that there is no subjective or objective reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the historical CSLI records and 
reiterated the same reasoning provided by the Fifth Circuit.92  
The court explained that “any arguable ‘search’ should be resolved 
in favor of the government” in cases such as this because Congress 
served substantial government interests by enacting the SCA.93 
The Eleventh Circuit evaluated the SCA standard in a 
virtually identical way to that of the Fifth Circuit.94  The court 
explained that the SCA did not lower the bar for Fourth 
 
 88.  Id. at 615.  This interpretation protects the reasonable expectations 
of privacy that the Fourth Amendment recognizes. Id.  This case is only 
dealing with the narrow issue of obtaining historical CSLI for specified cell 
phones via SCA orders. Id. 
 89.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 90.  Aaron Smith, Americans and Their Cell Phones, PEW RESEARCH 
CENTER (Aug. 15, 2011), http://www.pewinternet.org/2011/08/15/americans-
and-their-cell-phones/.  As of 2011, 83% of American adults owned some kind 
of cell phone for the essential tasks of information-seeking and 
communication. Id. 
 91.  785 F.3d 498, 518 (11th Cir. 2015).  In Davis, the Government sought 
to obtain telephone records from the defendant’s service provider for a sixty-
seven-day period, which was the time span of seven different armed robberies 
that the police suspected the defendant of committing. Id. at 501.  The 
Government’s “application requested production of stored ‘telephone 
subscriber records’ and ‘phone toll records,’ including the ‘corresponding 
geographic location data (cell site) . . . .’” Id. at 502. 
 92.  Id. at 511.  
 93.  Id. at 518. 
 94.  See id. at 505; In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 
F.3d 600, 614–15 (5th Cir. 2013).  
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Amendment purposes, but rather requiring a court order raised 
the bar from an ordinary subpoena to one with additional privacy 
protections.95  As explained in more depth below,96 the evaluation 
should not be one that considers how the standard essentially 
could be worse; the analysis should be strictly focused on whether 
or not the standard comports with the protections that the Fourth 
Amendment guarantees. 
The Eleventh Circuit attempted to support its reasoning that 
historical CSLI is very different from GPS data because it does not 
give as precise of a location as a GPS does.97  Moreover, while that 
may be true in certain areas, it is fact-specific based on a cell 
phone’s location.98  Where more towers exist, and as technology 
continues to advance, a more accurate location will be obtained.99  
Regardless, the court reasoned that there is no reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this information and that the 
information serves a compelling government interest.100  And, 
even if individuals are not voluntarily conveying this information 
and establish a reasonable expectation of privacy in the 
information, the same information could be obtained and be just 
as useful to the government’s interest if a warrant was 
required.101 
3. United States v. Graham I & II 
Conversely, the Fourth Circuit, in Graham I, decided in 2015 
“that the government’s procurement of the historical CSLI at 
issue . . . was an unreasonable search.”102  However, the Fourth 
Circuit reheard the case en banc in 2016 and reversed the original 
panel’s decision.103  Nonetheless, the panel decision in Graham I 
provides a thoughtful and thorough analysis, outlining various 
applicable arguments on the topic.  It is also a topic that is likely 
not yet through running its course in the court system.104 
 
 95.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 505–06. 
 96.  See infra Part IV.D. 
 97.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 515. 
 98.  Id. 
 99.  Id. at 521. 
 100.  Id. at 517–18. 
 101.  See id. at 518.  
 102.  Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 
421 (4th Cir. 2016). 
 103.  See Graham II, 824 F.3d 421, 424 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc).  
 104.  Although Graham I, which best supports the thesis of this paper, 
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After the defendant had been arrested for allegedly 
committing a series of armed robberies, a detective found two cell 
phones in the defendant’s truck while executing a valid search 
warrant.105  Going beyond the scope of that warrant, however, the 
government sought and obtained court orders for disclosure of 
historical CSLI for calls and text messages transmitted to and 
from the cell phones.106  It then used the court order to obtain 
historical CSLI from the cell phone service provider for a 221-day 
time period.107  Both the circuit panel in Graham I and the court 
in Graham II addressed whether the government’s acquisition of 
records without a warrant based on probable cause constituted an 
unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment.108 
In Graham I, the circuit panel held that people have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI records 
and explained that “the government invades a reasonable 
expectation of privacy when it relies upon technology not in 
general use to discover the movements of an individual over an 
extended period of time.”109  The circuit panel reasoned that 
historical CSLI allows the “government to trace the movements of 
the cell phone and its user across public and private spaces and 
thereby discover the private activities and personal habits of the 
user.”110  Additionally, applying the third-party doctrine to 
historical CSLI would essentially permit the government to use a 
 
was reheard en banc and overturned, it should be noted that circuit court 
cases reheard en banc are attractive candidates for review by the Supreme 
Court. Timothy S. Bishop, Jeffrey W. Sarles & Stephen J. Kane, Tips on 
Petitioning for and Opposing Certiorari in the U.S. Supreme Court, 34 
LITIGATION, Winter 2008, at 26, 28.  Specifically, one study found that the 
Supreme Court is three times as likely to grant a petition for certiorari to a 
case that has been heard en banc as it is to grant certiorari petitions 
involving panel decisions. Id.  It is therefore likely that this issue could be 
heard in the United States Supreme Court and therefore using Graham I and 
its abundance of credible arguments is both necessary and insightful.  
 105.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 340. 
 106.  Id. at 341.  
 107.  Id.  
 108.  Id. at 342.  
 109.  Id. at 349.  
 110.  Id. at 345. Consider a Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court 
decision where the court leaves open the possibility that while generally a 
search warrant is required, one might not be if the request for historical data 
is for “a period of six hours or less.” Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d 
231, 237 (Mass. 2015). 
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person’s phone as a tracking device without probable cause.111  
Therefore, Graham I determined that the government’s 
acquisition of this information was a search as cell phone users 
have an objectively reasonable expectation of privacy in this 
information because of one’s expected privacy in private habits 
and personal activities.112 
Nevertheless, a circuit split amongst the Fourth, Fifth, and 
Eleventh Circuits ended when Graham II was decided.  In 
Graham II, the court held that the government’s acquisition of 
historical CSLI from the defendants’ cell phone provider did not 
violate the Fourth Amendment because United States Supreme 
Court precedent mandates that the third-party doctrine is 
controlling in this instance and an individual does not have a 
reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI.113  The court 
explained that the provider only receives the historical CSLI 
information when a cell phone user’s phone exchanges signals 
with the nearest available cell tower and that it is clear that the 
user is conveying the information to the service provider.114  The 
court also based its holding—that cell phone users voluntarily 
convey their historical CSLI to service providers—on the 
proposition that cell phone users understand on some level the 
basic need to transmit information to the cell service provider in 
order for the phone to operate properly.115  The dissenting judge 
in Graham II, although recommending that the defendant’s 
convictions be affirmed under the exclusionary rule’s good-faith 
exception, nevertheless accurately asserted that the Fourth 
 
 111.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 357.  
 112.  Id. at 345.  
 113.  824 F.3d 421, 424–25 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc). However, as 
discussed later in more depth, the Fourth Circuit in Graham II seemed to 
suggest that it is likely that the Supreme Court may very well do away with 
the third-party doctrine in the future, which would change the outcome of 
cases involving the government acquisition of historical CSLI. See id. at 425.  
 114.  Id. at 429. The true issue in this inquiry is not whether the 
information is being conveyed, but whether it is voluntary. Id. at 427. 
 115.  See id. at 430. In its reasoning, the court notes that “courts have 
attached no constitutional significance to the distinction between records of 
incoming versus outgoing phone calls.” Id. at 431.  However, perhaps as 
technology advances it will become more apparent that (1) individuals need 
some form of communicative device such as a cell phone to actively 
participate in society, and (2) individuals have no control over their phone 
connecting to a signal when someone calls or messages their phone.  Perhaps 
then may courts begin to make this distinction and realize the lack of 
voluntariness involved in conveying historical CSLI to service providers. 
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Circuit “majority’s determination that there was no Fourth 
Amendment violation . . . [is a] conclusion that ‘will have profound 
consequences.’”116 
B. If There Was a Search, Is a Warrant Based on Probable Cause 
Needed to Legitimize the Search? 
Circuit courts are currently in agreement that the 
government’s acquisition of historical CSLI from service providers 
is not a search and therefore does not require a warrant based on 
probable cause.117  The Fourth, Fifth, and Eleventh Circuits have 
held that no search has occurred because there is not a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in historical CSLI records, so these courts 
have not answered the question as to whether a warrant based on 
probable cause is required to obtain this information.  Because the 
circuit panel declared that there was a reasonable expectation of 
privacy in this information, and therefore there was a search, the 
Graham I court held that a warrant based on probable cause was 
required to obtain historical cell site location information.118  As 
argued below, when a court does abide by the Fourth Amendment 
and declares that a search has occurred, the next logical and 
constitutional step should be to require a warrant based on 
probable cause because none of the exceptions to the warrant 
requirement are applicable.119 
IV. ARGUMENTS IN FAVOR OF AND AGAINST THE GOVERNMENT’S NEED 
FOR A WARRANT BASED ON PROBABLE CAUSE TO OBTAIN HISTORICAL 
CSLI DATA 
A. Reasonable Subjective and Objective Expectations of Privacy 
Where a reasonable expectation of privacy exists, government 
 
 116.  Id. at 441 n.1 (Wynn, J., dissenting in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (quoting Graham I, 796 F.3d at 378 n.1 (Motz, J., dissenting in 
part and concurring in the judgment)). 
 117. The Graham II majority recognizes that this issue may very well be 
reconsidered by the United States Supreme Court in the near future at which 
time the court could overrule or reject the third-party doctrine and thereby 
change the format for deciding this issue.  See 824 F.3d at 425 (en banc). 
 118.  796 F.3d at 360–61.  In Graham I, the Court ultimately concluded 
that the good-faith exception applied and therefore the data obtained was not 
subject to suppression under the exclusionary rule. Id. at 363.  However, this 
panel was overridden on this issue when the case was reheard en banc. 
Graham II, 824 F.3d at 424–25 (en banc). 
 119.  See infra Part IV.  
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procurement of information is a search.  In using historical CSLI 
data to track a cell phone’s location, the government uses 
technology not available to the general public.120  Additionally, 
some courts have put a great emphasis on the extended amount of 
time that the government monitors when obtaining the historical 
CSLI, suggesting that perhaps a short amount of time would not 
require a warrant, but a longer amount could.121  However, while 
the increased amount of time and information gathered is 
certainly concerning, if an individual has a reasonable expectation 
of privacy in their historical CSLI, requiring a warrant should not 
hinge on an amount of time.  Making a warrant requirement 
based on a vague standard will only create more ambiguity in 
future situations. 
Society’s reasonable expectation of privacy has changed as 
technology has advanced.122  One school of thought asserts that 
“[l]aw enforcement tactics must be allowed to advance with 
technological changes, in order to prevent criminals from 
circumventing the justice system.”123  However, this argument is 
groundless.  An individual should not be forced to exchange his or 
her constitutional right to be free from unreasonable searches for 
innovations in and use of technology.  The Fourth Circuit 
eloquently articulated this point in Graham I when it asserted 
that “the advent of new technology alone—even major 
technological advances—is not a sufficient basis upon which to 
infer an equally dramatic shift in people’s privacy 
expectations.”124 
 
 120.  See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 349 (“The Government invades a 
[person’s] reasonable expectation of privacy when it relies upon technology 
not in general use to discover the movements of an individual over an 
extended period of time.” (emphasis added)).   
 121.  See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Estabrook, 38 N.E.3d 231, 238 (Mass. 
2015). 
 122.  See In re United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 
614 (5th Cir. 2013).  For example, consider how several years ago individuals 
could travel through an airport and board an airplane without passing 
through a metal detector, taking their shoes off, taking certain items out of 
their bags, having their bags screened, or possibly being stopped for further 
examination.  Today, however, technology has existed long enough to 
consider these procedures as normal and routine.  Thus, over time an 
individual’s expectation of privacy in his or her belongings has been greatly 
reduced.  
 123.  Id. (quoting United States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778 (6th Cir. 
2012)). 
 124.  796 F.3d at 359.  
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Additionally, the abundance of information revealed through 
historical CSLI strongly suggests that there is a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in the records.  In In re Historical Cell Site 
Data, the defense devoted part of its argument “on what 
information cell site data reveals—location information” to prove 
the unconstitutionality of the SCA standard.125  It also analyzed 
the government’s request for the historical CSLI under the 
framework of United States Supreme Court precedents on 
tracking devices.126  Obtaining historical CSLI and gaining 
information from tracking devices are similar in that both produce 
location data of an individual for a given amount of time, and both 
may track individuals to their home; a place that generally has 
been given heightened protections by the courts.  Distinct 
differences between the two location-gathering strategies, 
however, make it even more reasonable that historical CSLI 
would be protected under the Fourth Amendment against a 
warrantless search, just like the prolonged GPS monitoring of a 
vehicle.127 
The defense also indicated that cell phones can travel places 
that cars or containers cannot go or are unlikely to go, which 
makes tracking historical CSLI more intrusive than GPS 
monitoring.128  For example, while a car may take someone from 
one location to another, they could easily get in another vehicle, 
take public transportation, or go to an area that may not be 
accessible by a car.  While a GPS is obviously intrusive, historical 
CSLI can reveal just as much, and more, about a person’s 
movements. 
Another common, yet defective, argument against requiring 
the government to obtain a warrant before acquisition of historical 
CSLI is that the information obtained is much less intrusive than 
using a GPS to monitor a person’s movements or examining the 
content of an individual’s cell phone.  This argument, however, 
does not take into consideration the amount of information that 
can be discovered from a historical evaluation of an individual’s 
CSLI.  Justice Sotomayor persuasively exhibited this in her 
concurrence in United States v. Jones, when she described what is 
 
 125.  724 F.3d at 608. 
 126.  Id. 
 127.  See United States v. Jones, 132 S. Ct. 945, 949 (2012). 
 128.  In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 609. 
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known as the “Mosaic Theory.”129  She posits, “I would ask 
whether people reasonably expect that their movements will be 
recorded and aggregated in a manner that enables the 
Government to ascertain, more or less at will, their political and 
religious beliefs, sexual habits, and so on.”130  As technology 
advances and more cell towers are constructed, the precision of 
the location that historical CSLI will be able to provide to the 
government will essentially paint a picture of an individual’s life.  
It is undeniable that this type of surveillance of an individual is 
neither subjectively nor objectively reasonable. 
B. The Third-Party Doctrine Is “Ill Suited to the Digital Age”131 
Parties have taken several different approaches in arguing 
about whether the government needs a warrant based on probable 
cause to obtain historical CSLI from cell service providers.  For 
example, in In re Historical Cell Site Data, the government argued 
that cell phone users voluntarily convey their location to their 
service providers when they make a call and that they nonetheless 
voluntarily continue to make such calls.132  In opposition, the 
ACLU contended that a cell phone user is not voluntarily 
conveying his location because “[w]hen a cell phone user makes or 
receives a call, there is no indication to the user that making or 
receiving that call will . . . locate the caller” and therefore a user 
cannot voluntarily convey something he does not know he has.133  
The court declared that cell phone users do voluntarily convey 
their information because they understand that their cell phones 
must send a signal to a nearby tower in order to connect a call.134 
Absent clear reasoning, the Fifth Circuit agreed with the 
government’s argument that the conveyance of information is 
voluntary.135  The court asserted that the cell phone user is 
sending the information so that the provider can perform the 
 
 129.  Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 956 (Sotomayor, J., concurring). 
 130.  Id. (Sotomayor, J., concurring).  
 131.  “Justice Sotomayor has suggested that the [third-party] doctrine is 
‘ill suited to the digital age, in which people reveal a great deal of information 
about themselves to third parties in the course of carrying out mundane 
tasks.’” Graham II, 824 F.3d 421, 438 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (quoting 
Jones, 132 S. Ct. at 957 (Sotomayor, J., concurring)).  
 132. 724 F.3d at 612.   
 133. Id. (alteration in original). 
 134. Id. at 613.  
 135. Id. 
318 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW  [Vol. 22:297 
service of connecting calls made to other users.136  Nonetheless, it 
is very important to note that cell towers are pinged when cell 
phone users make calls or send text messages, as well as when 
they receive calls and messages.137  Therefore, the cell user is not 
technically conveying the information to the cell providers 
themselves simply by possessing a phone and a cell phone user is 
certainly not voluntarily turning over this information.  It is not 
constitutionally sound to “force an ill-fitting presumption of 
voluntariness in order to strip Fourth Amendment protection from 
a defendant.”138 
The Fourth Circuit correctly held in Graham I that it was 
clear that cell phone users do not voluntarily convey historical 
CSLI to service providers.139  The Graham I opinion explained 
that individuals are not conveying this information to service 
providers; rather the service provider automatically generates this 
information, both “with and without the user’s active 
participation.”140  Furthermore, the Graham I court made an 
important distinction between historical CSLI records and the 
records that were involved in Smith and Miller, explaining that 
unlike phone numbers dialed or bank records created, 
respectively, historical CSLI is neither tangible nor visible to a cell 
phone user.141  Common sense would lead one to believe that 
something so intangible that an individual does not have the 
option but to technically “convey” would not be subject to the 
third-party doctrine as it is clearly not voluntary. 
A cell phone user’s knowledge about how the cell signals and 
towers work is not what is at issue in this particular argument.142  
Rather, the issue is whether the information is being conveyed to 
the service providers voluntarily.  For instance, many individuals 
are aware that the government is capable of listening to phone 
 
 136. Id. 
 137. See Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 355 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 
F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).  
 138. Graham II, 824 F.3d 421, 443 n.3 (4th Cir. 2016) (en banc) (Wynn, J., 
dissenting). 
 139. Graham I, 796 F.3d at 353. 
 140. Id. at 354.  
 141. Id. at 355.  
 142.  See Graham II, 824 F.3d at 445 (en banc) (Wynn, J., dissenting) 
(“[E]ven if cell phone customers have a vague awareness that their location 
affects the number of ‘bars’ on their phone, they surely do not know which 
cell phone tower their call will be routed through . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
2017] HISTORICAL CELL SITE DATA 319 
conversations, but that does not mean that individuals do not 
have a reasonable expectation of privacy in those conversations.  
On the contrary, the term “voluntary” and what constitutes as a 
voluntary conveyance is the major point of discrepancy in 
determining whether cell phone users have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in their historical CSLI.  If cell phone users 
truly convey their location voluntarily to cell service providers, 
they would not have a reasonable expectation of privacy, and 
consequently there would be no search and no warrant 
requirement.  However, individuals cannot expect to have 
voluntarily conveyed information via a device that is crucial to 
active participation in today’s society.143 
Moreover, this argument is strongly supported by statistics of 
both the percentage of Americans who own cell phones, as well as 
the percentage of Americans living in households with only 
wireless telephone service.  About ninety-seven percent of adults 
had a cell phone in 2013, whereas  about forty-seven percent of 
households have only wireless telephone service in 2016.144  The 
high percentage of adults who possess cell phones proves that, for 
better or for worse, these devices have become an integral part of 
life.145  It is at odds with common sense to conclude that a person 
voluntarily conveys information through a mechanism that 
requires them to do so in order to function as a member of society.  
Once a person’s choice becomes so drastic that it is between 
participation in society or protecting their Fourth Amendment 
right, the choice is no longer voluntary.  The third-party doctrine 
is employed to restrict Fourth Amendment protections to 
situations where privacy claims are reasonable, not to diminish 
Fourth Amendment protections where developing technology 
 
 143.  See Graham I, 796 F.3d at 355–56 (citing Riley v. California, 134 S. 
Ct. 2473, 2484 (2014); City of Ontario v. Quon, 560 U.S. 746, 760 (2010)).  
 144.  Maranda Gibson, Cell Phone Statistics: Updated 2013, ARKADIN 
COLLABORATION SERVICES (Jan. 23, 2014), https://www.accuconference.com/ 
blog/cell-phone-statistics-updated-2013/; Kyley McGeeney, Pew Research 
Center will call 75% Cellphones for Surveys in 2016, PEW RESEARCH CENTER 
(Jan. 5, 2016), http://www.pewresearch.org/fact-tank/2016/01/05/pew-
research-center-will-call-75-cellphones-for-surveys-in-2016/. 
 145.  In addition to communication, cell phones are important because 
they save people money. Importance of Mobile Phone Technology, MY ESSAY 
POINT (Feb. 1, 2015), http://myessaypoint.com/importance-of-mobile-phone-
technology.  They are an all-in-one device, thus helping businesses function 
more efficiently, as well as ensuring personal safety.  Id. 
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provides new ways to obtain private information.146  Since cell 
phone users do not voluntarily convey historical CSLI to service 
providers, “the third-party doctrine alone cannot resolve whether 
the government . . . conducted a Fourth Amendment ‘search.’”147  
Rather, an independent Fourth Amendment evaluation is needed 
to determine whether “the government violates a subjective 
expectation of privacy that society recognizes as reasonable” by 
obtaining historical CSLI.148 
Importantly, while the court in Graham II did reverse the 
decision in Graham I, the court explicitly stated that “[t]he 
Supreme Court may in the future limit, or even eliminate, the 
third-party doctrine.”149  The court also stated that “unless and 
until the Supreme Court holds, [it is] bound by the contours of the 
third-party doctrine . . . .”150  It is not unreasonable to assume 
based on the language of the Fourth Circuit and its multiple 
references to the day that the United States Supreme Court 
eliminates the third-party doctrine, that the court in Graham II 
chose to include that language to acknowledge the obvious 
shortcomings of the third-party doctrine.  Additionally, the Fourth 
Circuit likely used this language to suggest that if the United 
States Supreme Court did make the decision to do away with the 
doctrine that it would not be considered irrational.  Moreover, it 
could also be inferred from this statement that the court would 
have come to a different conclusion on whether an individual has 
a reasonable expectation of privacy in historical CSLI if the third-
party doctrine were not controlling precedent. 
C. Historical CSLI is Only Available Through Technological 
Means 
The Fourth Circuit persuasively stated: “The Supreme Court 
has recognized an individual’s privacy interests in comprehensive 
accounts of her movements, in her location, and in the location of 
her personal property in private spaces, particularly when such 
information is available only through technological means not in 
 
 146.  See Orin S. Kerr, An Equilibrium-Adjustment Theory of the Fourth 
Amendment, 125 HARV. L. REV. 476, 527 (2011).  
 147.  Graham II, 824 F.3d at 446 (en banc) (Wynn, J., dissenting).  
 148.  Id. (quoting Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 33 (2001)). 
 149.  Id. at 425 (majority opinion).  
 150.  Id. at 437.  
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use by the general public.”151  This argument has great weight 
here.  Historical CSLI allows the government to place an 
individual in a variety of places, including private places such as 
the home.152  This type of search should be granted a great deal of 
protection because like United States v. Karo153 and Kyllo v. 
United States,154 it has the effect of placing the government in an 
individual’s home.  Moreover, the Fourth Circuit correctly points 
to the fact that inspection of long-term historical CSLI gives rise 
to an even greater privacy interest than in Karo and Kyllo because 
a cell phone is carried by a person, can go places that other devices 
are not likely to go, and thus can directly track an individual.155 
D. The SCA Standard is Unconstitutional 
First and foremost, since government acquisition of historical 
CSLI is a search, the SCA standard of specific and articulable 
facts is unconstitutional.  The SCA standard allows the 
government to conduct searches without having to show probable 
cause, contrary to Fourth Amendment jurisprudence.  Both the 
Fifth and Eleventh Circuit courts have evaluated the SCA 
standard by considering the added protections that Congress 
instated with the SCA that did not exist prior to its enactment 
when all that was needed was a subpoena.156  The proper 
analysis, however, is not how far the standard has developed, but 
whether or not the standard is in compliance with Fourth 
Amendment principles. 
This analysis seems inconsistent because the courts are 
essentially saying, “The government is doing better than they 
used to,” but that is not enough when a person’s fundamental 
 
 151.  Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 345, rev’d en banc, 824 F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 
2016) (4th Cir. 2015). 
 152.  See id. at 346.  
 153.  468 U.S. 705, 714 (1984) (holding that government’s “monitoring of a 
beeper in a private residence, a location not open to visual surveillance, 
violates the Fourth Amendment rights of those who have a justifiable 
interest in the privacy of the residence.”). 
 154.  533 U.S. 27, 40 (2001) (holding that government’s use of a device not 
available to general public to explore details of home that would previously 
have been unknowable without physical intrusion violates the Fourth 
Amendment). 
 155.  Graham I, 796 F.3d at 347. 
 156.  United States v. Davis, 785 F.3d 498, 505 (11th Cir. 2015); In re 
United States for Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d 600, 607 (5th Cir. 2013). 
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right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is at 
stake.  This right has a long-standing history of protection 
throughout Fourth Amendment jurisprudence and advancements 
in technology should not skew the courts’ analyses.  Additionally, 
even if these records could be analogized with other types of 
records that the government acquires with a subpoena, here, these 
records can be distinguished because the information that 
comprises the historical CSLI is not being voluntarily conveyed to 
the service provider. 
E. Rebutting Argument that Requiring a Warrant Allows 
Criminals to Circumvent the System and Why the Lack of 
Applicability of the Exigency Exception Undermines This 
Argument 
In focusing on the acquisition of historical CSLI, it is unclear 
how requiring the government to obtain a warrant before 
procuring historical CSLI from cell service providers would allow 
criminals to outwit the justice system.157  Unlike other forms of 
evidence that could be destroyed if not obtained quickly, the data 
involved in these searches is historical and already stored by the 
service providers.  Consequently, unless in the unlikely event that 
a criminal has an inside connection with a service provider who 
can erase this information before the government can obtain a 
warrant, this argument is null.  Therefore, an exigency argument 
cannot support the assertion that law enforcement tactics must be 
allowed to advance with technology.  Because the data in question 
is all historical data, time is not of the essence.158  Rather, the 
data is already collected and getting a warrant within a 
reasonable amount of time would not affect the information.  
Regardless of the amount of time that a service provider 
maintains the historical CSLI, due to the relatively short amount 
of time that it takes to obtain a warrant in today’s court systems, 
it would not make a great difference in the government’s ability to 
secure the data before it was destroyed. 
In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit asserted that allowing the 
government to obtain historical CSLI without a warrant assists in 
 
 157.  See In re Historical Cell Site Data, 724 F.3d at 614 (quoting United 
States v. Skinner, 690 F.3d 772, 778 (6th Cir. 2012)). 
 158.  The argument that time is not of the essence for historical CSLI 
assumes that the service provider maintains the records for a reasonable 
amount of time.  
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investigations, particularly in the early stages “when the police 
lack probable cause and are confronted with multiple suspects.”159  
The court further stated that the SCA court order allows the 
police to “help . . . build probable cause against the guilty, deflect 
suspicion from the innocent, aid in the search for truth, and 
judiciously allocate scarce investigative resources.”160  While this 
may be accurate, the ease of police work cannot be a justification 
for limiting an individual’s Fourth Amendment protection against 
unreasonable searches.  There are likely several instances where 
allowing the police to circumvent the warrant requirement would 
be beneficial to an investigation, but that is not a reason to take 
away a constitutional protection.  The Eleventh Circuit also 
asserted the government’s compelling interest in ensuring that 
the rights of innocent suspects are vindicated.161  However, 
whether an individual is innocent or guilty, his or her 
constitutional rights should remain intact. 
F. The Amount of Time and Resources to Obtain a Warrant Is an 
Invalid Argument 
It is not a waste of time or resources to require the 
government to obtain a warrant every time it wishes to obtain 
historical CSLI.  A judge issuing a court order still has to check if 
the SCA’s specific and articulable facts standard is met, just as a 
judge has to consider if the probable cause standard has been met 
to obtain a warrant.162  Furthermore, law enforcement is still 
going to court and using essentially the same resources to obtain a 
court order as when they obtain a warrant.  Particularly, for 
historical CSLI, there is no rush for this information because it is 
not real-time, and it is not likely to be destroyed in the amount of 
time that it would require to get a warrant.  Allowing the 
government to procure this type of information without a warrant 
is allowing the police, not criminals, to circumvent the criminal 
justice system. 
 
 159.  Davis, 785 F.3d at 518.  
 160.  Id.  
 161.  Id. 
 162.  See, e.g., Google Transparency Report, GOOGLE, https://www.google. 
com/transparencyreport/userdatarequests/legalprocess/#whats_the_difference 
(last visited Sept. 25, 2016).  
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G. Looking Forward to Further Advancements in Technology 
The precision of the historical CSLI in these cases is 
dependent on the size of the coverage ranges of the cell sites.163  
In urban areas, where there is a greater density of cell towers 
with smaller radii of operability, there is better accuracy of 
location.164  In Graham I, the court explained that “[s]ervice 
providers have begun to increase network capacity and to fill gaps 
in network coverage by installing low-power cells such as 
‘microcells’ and ‘femtocells,’ which cover areas as small as 40 
feet.”165  As companies compete, it is only natural that this 
technology will continue to advance and become more capable of 
extremely precise location.166 
With more precision, historical CSLI further infringes on an 
individual’s Fourth Amendment protection by providing a more 
discrete location than it currently does.  As technology advances 
and cell phones become an even more intricate part of a person’s 
everyday life, cell towers will either increase in number or become 
better at locating the individual.  The existing competition 
between cell service providers can be seen in the various 
commercials and advertisements that cell service providers use 
today, arguing with each other over who has the fastest 
connection, a trait that is based on a tower’s presence or absence 
in a given area.167 
 
 163.  See Graham I, 796 F.3d 332, 343 (4th Cir. 2015), rev’d en banc, 824 
F.3d 421 (4th Cir. 2016).  For example, as seen in that case, “Sprint/Nextel’s 
custodian testified at trial that the cell sites listed in the records each had, at 
most, a two-mile radius of operability.  Each cell site, therefore, covered no 
greater than approximately 12.6 square miles, divided into three sectors of 
approximately 4.2 square miles or less.”  Id. at 350 n.9. 
 164.  See id. at 343. 
 165.  Id. at 350–51 (citing Public Safety Tech Topic #23–Femtocells, 
FEDERAL COMMUNICATIONS COMMISSION, https://www.fcc.gov/help/public-
safety-tech-topic-23-femtocells (last visited Sept. 25, 2016); Small Cells 
Market 2014-2019: Femtocell, Picocell, & Microcell Prospects for LTE, SONs, 
Wireless Offloading & Heterogeneous Networks, PR NEWSWIRE (Apr. 7, 2015 
8:10 AM), http://www.prnewswire.com/news-releases/small-cells-market-
2014-2019-femtocell-picocell-microcell-prospects-for-lte-sons-wireless-offload 
ing-heterogeneous-networks-300061444.html; Nancy Gohring, Femtocells 
Make Way into Enterprises, COMPUTERWORLD (Mar. 7, 2011 6:00 AM), 
http://www.computerworld.com/article/2550032/mobile-wireless/femtocells-
make-way-into-enterprises.html). 
 166.  See id. at 351.  
 167.  See, e.g., Alex Wagner, T-Mobile Uses Colorful Balls to Compare its 
LTE Coverage to Verizon’s in New Ad, TMONEWS (Jan. 24, 2016), 
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Often, courts will defer to the legislature to make a change or 
decision that they believe that branch of the government is more 
suited to make.168  While the legislature may be able to resolve 
this case by abolishing the SCA standard, the court is also capable 
of addressing this issue, mostly because the standard is in direct 
contradiction with a constitutional right.  There are several valid 
arguments in support of holding the SCA standard 
unconstitutional, and it would not be contrary to Fourth 
Amendment precedent for the court to hold so. 
CONCLUSION 
The Fourth Amendment not only “permit[s] access to that 
which technology hides” but also “protect[s] that which technology 
exposes.”169  Individuals have a reasonable expectation of privacy 
in historical CSLI data.  Moreover, individuals are not voluntarily 
conveying this information to service providers.  Conveyance of 
historical CSLI is “‘not voluntary,’ for ‘[l]iving off the grid . . . is 
not a prerequisite to enjoying the protection of the Fourth 
Amendment.’”170  Because individuals have a reasonable 
expectation of privacy in this information, the acquisition of this 
information is a search.  Under the Fourth Amendment, this type 
of search requires a warrant based on probable cause.  If an 
individual’s constitutional rights are to be upheld on this issue, 
the United States Supreme Court would abolish the third-party 
doctrine as it applies to historical CSLI and create a standard 
whereby individuals are not faced with the choice of using 
technology and participating actively in society or their 
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